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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the issue of loan officers’ confidence in making loan approval decisions 
across different loan monitoring types. Loan officers were asked to assign loan approval 
probabilities given a traditional loan monitoring capability or a continuous reporting capability. 
We find that the higher the level of confidence the loan officer had in his/her loan approval 
decision, the higher the loan approval probability assigned to the loan application.  However, that 
effect was not consistent across monitoring types (traditional vs. continuous reporting). Our 
results suggest that loan officer confidence only impacts the loan approval probabilities for the 
traditional monitoring cases. Confidence did not significantly influence loan approval 
probabilities for the continuous reporting cases; although, the loan approval probabilities for the 
continuous reporting, low confidence cases exceeded 50 percent.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 
he private debt market is the primary source of external funds for most small and mid-sized firms.  In 
a frictionless market, any firm with a positive net present value investment opportunity would 
receive the required funds (Petersen and Rajan 1994).  Unfortunately, frictions such as information 
asymmetry prevent funds from flowing to some firms that have profitable investment opportunities.  Implementing 
mechanisms that mitigate the existing frictions to a level necessary to secure financing is in the best interests of 
these small and mid-sized firms.   One possible alternative is for firms to agree to provide additional information, 
ex-post, and to allow the commercial lender greater monitoring capabilities. A potential application of greater 
monitoring capabilities is continuous reporting (CR).   
 
Simply stated, continuous reporting means “making digitized information available through electronic 
channels simultaneously with its creation,” (Elliott 2002, pp. 140).  With today’s systems, many businesses are 
capturing transactions continuously, making continuous reporting of those transactions both possible and relatively 
easy (Alles et al. 2002).  While the type of information is important, the timeliness of receiving the information is 
critical because information that arrives too late to affect a decision is virtually worthless (Demski 1980; Demski 
and Feltham 1976; Feltham 1972).  CR is one viable method to ensure banks receive information about a firm’s 
performance in a timely manner.  This continuous reporting (monitoring) interaction between a bank and a borrower 
may provide the bank with sufficient information about a firm’s affairs “so as to lower the cost and increase the 
availability of credit to mitigate” information asymmetries (Petersen and Rajan 1994).   
 
Utilizing the Internet as the backbone, firms and commercial lenders could be connected. In such a CR 
environment, the velocity of communication between the borrower and the lender increases dramatically, allowing 
the lender to continuously monitor the financial condition of the borrower through evergreen financial statements 
and ratios generated from real-time accounting systems (Woodroof and Searcy 2001). CR should facilitate and 
accelerate the communication between the lender and the borrower regarding loan performance while the loan is 
outstanding, thus reducing the lender’s uncertainty regarding the borrower’s financial condition.  Reducing 
uncertainty minimizes default risk, thereby allowing the lender to accept the loan, ceteris paribus (Palepu et al. 
1997).   
T 
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For CR to be successful in the commercial lending domain, loan officers would have to be confident in its 
ability to adequately monitor borrowers’ financial condition. More specifically, if loan officers lack confidence in 
CR, we would not expect them to positively incorporate that monitoring tool in their loan approval decisions. This 
study explores the issue of loan officers’ confidence and CR. We find that the higher the level of confidence the loan 
officer had in his/her loan approval decision, the higher the loan approval probability assigned to the loan 
application.  However, that effect was not consistent across monitoring types (Traditional vs. CR). Our results 
suggest that loan officer confidence only impacts the loan approval probabilities for the traditional monitoring cases. 
Confidence did not significantly influence loan approval probabilities for the CR cases; although, the loan approval 
probabilities for the CR, low confidence cases exceeded 50 percent.  
 
PRIOR RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
To our knowledge, there is only one study that empirically examines the effect CR has on the commercial 
lending application process; Searcy et al. (2009).  Searcy et al. (2009) conducts a web-based experiment with 66 
U.S. loan officers examining the potential benefits of continuous reporting in the commercial debt market.  The 
experiment is a 2 x 2 repeated measures design.  The reporting frequency (traditional, CR)
1
 and loan risk class (high, 
low) is administered between subjects. The banking relationship (new, existing) employs a within-subjects design. 
The case involves a medium-sized borrower seeking a $1,000,000 line of credit. The case provides background 
information and 26 facts the loan officers can use to make a loan approval decision (Beaulieu 1994; Blackwell et al. 
1998; and Danos 1989). The 26 facts describe accounting (8), character (6), industry (7), and company-specific (5) 
issues consistent with Beaulieu (1994). The lenders repeat the experiment a second time under the assumption the 
loan packet is from an existing client, as opposed to a new client.  
 
 Searcy et al. (2009) find that those companies considered high risk have a significantly higher loan 
approval rate if the company is willing to provide CR information compared to those high risk companies providing 
only quarterly information (i.e., traditional reporting).  The authors do not find any results for the companies 
considered low risk. The findings are consistent across both banking relationships. The participants are also asked to 
indicate their level of confidence in assigning the loan approval probability.  On a seven-point scale, ranging from 
not confident (0) to very confident (6), the loan officers appeared confident in their loan approval decisions (4.36 for 
new clients and 4.96 for existing clients). Our study centers around that last point, confidence in the loan approval 
decision. We use the data from Searcy et al. (2009) to explore the question: 
 
Research question:  Does loan officer confidence influence the loan approval decisions? 
 
Taylor (1975, p77) defines confidence in decisions as the “self-rated confidence in the correctness of the 
decision”.   Danos et al. (1989) indicate that early in the loan application process lenders have high-levels of 
confidence in their credit-granting decisions. The authors indicate that lenders attain that confidence based on 
general background information and highly summarized financial data.  The authors also find that in most cases 
subsequent information processed by the lenders did not alter the initial loan approval judgment but only increased 
their confidence in the initial judgment. That finding is consistent with prior studies indicating confidence increasing 
with additional information; even though judgmental accuracy remains relatively stable (e.g., Oskamp 1965; 
Einhorn & Hogarth 1978). While the initial judgment may be accurate (Murphy and Winkler 1977), overconfidence 
in judgments could lead to dire consequences (e.g., loan losses). Russo and Schoemaker (1992) find that primary 
knowledge does reduce overconfidence to some degree, but does not eliminate it altogether.  Searcy et al.’s (2009) 
experimental design precludes us from investigating overconfidence; however, the within subjects design will allow 
us to examine the change in confidence.
2
  
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 provides the demographic statistics. Since our interest is the interaction of confidence and 
monitoring type, we divided the sample data between low confidence and high confidence.
 3
  As shown in the table, 
most of the loan officers had high confidence in assigning a loan approval probability.
 
The age of the loan officers 
range from 42.8 (Traditional, Low confidence cell) to 48.6 (CR, low confidence cell). The loan officers’ bank 
experience range from 19.7 years (traditional, low confidence cell) to 23.0 years (traditional, high confidence cell). 
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The age and bank experience are similar to those found in other studies using commercial lenders (e.g., Wright and 
Davidson 2000).  
 
 
Table 1 
Demographic Information 
Panel A: Number of commercial lenders per case    
    High Confidence Low Confidence   
 Number % Number % Total % 
  Traditional reporting 28 42.4% 7 10.6% 35 53% 
  Continuous  reporting 21 31.8% 10 15.2% 31 47% 
     Total 49 100% 17 100% 66 100% 
 
Panel B: Demographic data       
 
 High Confidence Low Confidence Total 
 Bank Exp Age Bank Exp Age Bank Exp Age 
  Traditional reporting 23.0 47.8 19.7 42.8 22.3 46.8 
  Continuous  reporting 22.5 46.8 21.8 48.6 22.1 47.0 
     Total 22.9 47.2 21.5 46.9 22.3 47.1 
 
 
 
The response means and standard deviations are shown in Table 2. Based on reported means, the loan 
approvals for new clients are much higher when the loan officer has high confidence, regardless of monitoring type. 
However, the loan approval probability is above 50 percent for the low confidence/CR treatment indicating that the 
probability of loan approval for CR clients is greater than 50 percent even though the loan officers had low 
confidence in making the decision. 
 
 
Table 2 
Loan Approval Response Means for MONITORING by CONFIDENCE Interaction Cells 
(New Client) 
  CONFIDENCE 
  
 
Low Confidence 
mean (std dev) 
High Confidence 
mean (std dev) 
 Traditional (TRAD) 31.42 (18.86) 
Cell 1 
59.82 (32.25) 
Cell 2 
MONITORING   
 Continuous reporting (CR) 53.70 (22.24) 
Cell 3 
63.90 (26.77) 
Cell 4 
 
 
Two types of tests were used to investigate the statistical significance of the loan approval probabilities 
across the treatment cells, ANOVA and Contrasts. Table 3 reports the ANOVA results. The CONFIDENCE variable 
is significant (p-value 0.002) indicating that the higher the level of confidence the loan officer had in his/her 
decision, the higher the loan approval probability.   
 
We are most interested in the MONITORING *CONFIDENCE interaction in the model. That interaction is 
significant (p-value 0.037) suggesting that loan approval probability is influenced by loan officer confidence. Figure 
1 displays the relationship between loan officer confidence and monitoring type. The difference in means is greater 
for the low confidence condition (31.42-traditional vs. 53.70-CR) compared to the high confidence condition (59.82-
traditional vs. 63.90-CR). Figure 1 suggests that the relationship between confidence and approval is not consistent 
across both monitoring types. 
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Table 3 
Loan Approval Response 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA Model 
ANOVA Model1 (Sample size of 66 observations): 
Explanatory Variables and Interaction Terms DF2 F statistic3 P-Value4 R-square5 
MONITORING 1 8.28 0.005  
RISK 1 46.71 0.000  
CONFIDENCE 1 9.97 0.002  
BANK_EXP 1 0.83 0.366  
MONITORING *RISK 1 2.08 0.154  
MONITORING *CONFIDENCE 1 4.55 0.037  
     
     Overall Model Statistics 6 10.62 0.000 0.519 
1 The Loan Approval Response Model contains four dichotomous explanatory variables with two-way interactions or relevance 
regressed on response variable APPROVE in an ANOVA Model.  APPROVE is the probability of approval assigned to each loan 
case by the loan officer ranging from 0 to 100%.  MONITORING is a dichotomous explanatory measure coded 1 if the loan 
officer is given information updated and audited on a daily basis (continuous reporting basis), and coded 0 if the loan officer is 
given annual audited financial information and (unaudited) quarterly reports on its compliance with the agreed-to debt covenants 
traditional (traditional reporting basis).  RISK is a dichotomous explanatory variable coded 1 if the company is of high risk, and 
coded 0 otherwise.  BANK_EXP is a dichotomous explanatory variable coded 1 if the loan officer has a high level of bank 
experience, and coded 0 otherwise.  CONFIDENCE is a dichotomous explanatory variable coded 1 if the loan officer had a high 
level of confidence in his/her loan approval decision (loan officer assigned a confidence level of four or higher on a 7-point scale 
ranging from 0 to 6), 0 if the loan officer had a low or neutral level of confidence in his/her loan approval decision (confidence 
level of three or lower).  MONITORING *RISK is an interaction term that tests whether the relationship between audit approval 
and RISK is consistent at all levels of AUDIT.  The variable was included in the study by Searcy et al. (2009).  MONITORING 
*CONFIDENCE is an interaction term that tests whether the impact confidence has on loan approval is consistent for both 
traditional and continuous reporting cases.   
2 DF are the degrees of freedom.  
3 F statistic tests how well the overall model and individual variables account for the response variable’s behavior and are based 
on Type III, or partial sums of squares.    
4 P-Value is the probability of arriving at the F Statistic by chance occurrence. 
5 The R-square statistic measures the amount of variation in the response variable explained by the model.  This statistic ranges 
from 0 to 1, with the larger the value the better the model’s fit. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Relationship between confidence and monitoring type 
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Table 4 displays the results of the contrasts confirming the significance of the mean differences.  It appears 
confidence only impacts loan approval probability for the traditional treatment (p-value 0.019). In the CR treatment, 
confidence is not significant (p-value 0.348). The result is not too surprising given that the loan approval rate is 
somewhat high (> 53 percent) in the low confidence, CR cell. 
 
 
Table 4 
Planned Contrasts Results for Loan Approval Response (APPROVE): 
 F stat P Value2 
   
Contrast of CONFIDENCE for traditional  (1 -1 0 0): 
  test of 31.42 vs. 59.82, with 1 degree of freedom  
 
5.71 
 
0.019 
Contrast of CONFIDENCE for continuous reporting (0 0 1 -1): 
 test of 53.70 vs. 63.90, with 1 degree of freedom   
 
0.89 
 
0.348 
2 One-tail p-value for direction testing. 
 
 
We also ran separate ANOVA models to confirm the contrast results. As shown in Table 5, risk (p-value 
<0.001) and confidence (p-value 0.001) are highly significant in the traditional sample ANOVA model. Only risk is 
significant in the CR sample ANOVA model (p-value 0.001). Bank experience is not significant in either model. 
 
 
Table 5 
Loan Approval Response 2 X 2 X 2 ANOVA Model for Each Monitoring Type 
I. ANOVA Model for only the Traditional Sample (Sample size of 35 observations): 
 
1Explanatory Variables and 
Interaction Terms 
 
DF2 
 
F statistic3 
 
P-Value4 
 
R-square5 
     
RISK 1 33.55 0.000  
CONFIDENCE 1 13.04 0.001  
BANK_EXP 1 0.01 0.926  
     
     Overall Model Statistics 3 15.20 0.000 0.595 
 
I. ANOVA Model for only the Continuous Reporting Sample (Sample size of 31 observations): 
 
 
Explanatory Variables and 
Interaction Terms 
 
 
DF2 
 
 
F statistic3 
 
 
P-Value4 
 
 
R-square5 
     
RISK 1 13.54 0.001  
CONFIDENCE 1 0.56 0.462  
BANK_EXP 1 1.46 0.237  
     
     Overall Model Statistics  3 5.52 0.004 0.381 
 
 
1 All variables and test statistics were explained in Table 3.  
 
 
The results so far have examined the variables assuming the loan application was from a new client.  
Searcy et al. (2009) have the loan officers make loan approval decisions considering the client is an existing client 
(five year relationship).  The banking relationship variable is a within-subjects design.  Table 6 presents the loan 
approval probabilities assigned by the loan officers for existing client loan applications. The cell assignments are 
unchanged from Table 2. In other words, if a loan officer is in Cell 1 on Table 2, then he/she is in Cell 1 on Table 6.   
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Table 6 
Loan Approval Response Means for MONITORING by CONFIDENCE Interaction Cells 
(Existing Relationship) 
  CONFIDENCE 
  
 
Low Confidence 
mean (std dev) 
High Confidence 
mean (std dev) 
 Traditional (TRAD) 54.29 (29.64) 
Cell 1 
76.61 (26.67) 
Cell 2 
MONITORING   
 Continuous reporting (CR) 84.20 (7.94) 
Cell 3 
85.19 (14.88) 
Cell 4 
 
 
There are a couple of items worth noting. First, the loan approval probability in each cell is higher on Table 
6 as compared to Table 2. The result is not surprising as there is an entire research stream on banking relationships 
that indicate that banking relationships are valuable and existing clients have a comparable advantage over new 
clients (Hooks 2003; Blackwell and Winters 1997; Shockley and Thakor 1997; Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and 
Rajan 1994, 1995; Diamond 1991). Our interest is not in the within-subjects difference, but whether the differences 
between the cells are significant. Before examining cell differences, one other item is worth noting on Table 6. All 
cells show loan approval probabilities higher than 50 percent, suggesting that, even with low confidence, loan 
officers are more likely than not to approve a loan application for an existing client.  
 
Searcy et al. (2009) also have the loan officers indicate their confidence in assigning a loan approval 
probability for the existing client case. Table 7 displays the mean confidence levels for both conditions (new client, 
existing client).  Panel A reports the confidence means for the cells reported on Table 2.  
 
 
Table 7 
Loan Officer Confidence Means 
Panel A: Existing Relationship—Table 2  
 
  CONFIDENCE 
  
 
Low Confidence 
mean (std dev) 
High Confidence 
mean (std dev) 
 Traditional (TRAD) 1.86 (1.07) 
Cell 1 
5.32 (0.61) 
Cell 2 
MONITORING   
 Continuous reporting (CR) 1.60 (1.17) 
Cell 3 
5.19 (0.75) 
Cell 4 
Panel B: New Relationship—Table 6  
 
  CONFIDENCE 
  
 
Low Confidence 
mean (std de) 
High Confidence 
mean (std dev) 
 Traditional (TRAD) 4.00 (1.15) 
Cell 1 
5.21 (0.88) 
Cell 2 
MONITORING   
 Continuous reporting (CR) 3.80 (1.81) 
Cell 3 
5.48 (0.51) 
Cell 4 
 
 
Low confidence cells have a mean confidence below 2.0, while high confidence cells report a mean 
confidence above 5.0. Notice in Panel B a low confidence condition really does not exist. The lowest confidence 
mean is 3.8 (Cell 3).
4
 It appears the presence of a banking relationship greatly improves loan officers’ confidence in 
assigning loan approval probabilities, regardless of monitoring type. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the ANOVA models and the contrasts results, it appears the higher the loan officers’ confidence, 
the higher they higher loan approval probability assigned for those loan applications offering traditional monitoring. 
Loan officers’ confidence does not have the same effect with loan applications offering continuous reporting. 
However, even with low confidence, loan officers assigned a relative high loan approval probability to CR loan 
applications. For CR advocates, this study lends some support that firms implementing CR technology have a better 
chance to securing a bank loan as compared to firms that offer only traditional monitoring capabilities. On the other 
hand, the benefits of CR may diminish once a firm establishes a relationship with a lending institution. Since this 
study was exploratory in nature, care must be taken in interpreting the results. Further empirical studies are needed 
examining the potential of CR in the commercial lending environment, in general, and the effect of loan officers’ 
confidence in CR technology has on the lending decision, specifically.  
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1. The participants in the traditional manipulation were told the borrower would provide the bank “annual 
audited financial statements and (unaudited) quarterly reports on its compliance with agreed-to debt 
covenants.” The participants in the CR manipulation were told the borrower would provide the bank 
“financial information updated on a daily basis and accessed via CaneCorp’s web site for determining 
compliance with agreed-to debt covenants.” 
2. The loan officers evaluated the loan application assuming the application is from a new client. The case 
was repeated under the assumption the loan application was from an existing client. The banking 
relationship was the only change between the two cases. Loan officers’ confidences were collected for both 
cases. 
3. CONFIDENCE is a dichotomous explanatory variable coded 1 if the loan officer had a high level of 
confidence in his/her loan approval decision (loan officer assigned a confidence level of four or higher on a 
7-point scale ranging from 0 to 6), 0 if the loan officer had a low or neutral level of confidence in his/her 
loan approval decision (confidence level of three or lower).   
4. We use 4.0 and higher on the confidence scale to indicate high confidence. 
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